# 3. Staatliche und parastaatliche Akteure

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| 2008 | Buro, Andreas (2008): Der Afghanistan- Konflikt. Dossier IV des Monitoring-Projekt Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung. Gewalt- und Kriegsprävention, Hrsg. Kooperation für den Frieden | <https://www.friedenskooperative.de/sites/default/files/dossier_iv_din_a4_druck-1.pdf>  |
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## NATO und ISAF

(Die ISAF wurde ab 2003 von der NATO geführt. Ihr gehörten auch Nicht-NATO-Staaten, z.B. Australien, an.

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| 2021 | NATO and AfghanistanLast updated: 16 Sep. 2021  | <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm>  |
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| 2021 | NATO (2021): Operations and missions: past and present | <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm>  |

## Vereinte Nationen

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| 1946-2921 | UN Security Council Resolutions on AfghanistanListe aller Resolutionen (steht auch hier unten) | <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/?ctype=Afghanistan&cbtype=afghanistan>  |
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| 2008 | Ban Ki-moon (2008): "Wir dürfen Afghanistan nicht verlieren". Gastbeitrag im Tagesspiegel vom 12. Januar 2008 | <http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/regionen/Afghanistan/un-gs.html>  |
| 2010 | Mosadiq, Horia (2010): Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Can the UN right some wrongs?31 Oct 2010 | <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/international-engagement/reconciliation-in-afghanistan-can-the-un-right-some-wrongs/>  |
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| 2020 | UN Security Council (2020): Chronology of Events. Afghanistan | <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/afghanistan.php>  |

### UN Security Council Resolutions

**UN Documents for Afghanistan: Security Council Resolutions
Source: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un\_documents\_type/security-council-resolutions/page/1?ctype=Afghanistan&cbtype=afghanistan#038;cbtype=afghanistan**

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| Security Council Resolutions | [Return to full list](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/afghanistan/) |
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| 17 September 2021 [S/RES/2596](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/21.9%20res_2596_2021_e.pdf)  | This resolution extended the mandate of UNAMA until 17 March 2022.  |
| 30 August 2021 [S/RES/2593](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s%20res%202593.pdf)  | This was a resolution that addressed recent developments in Afghanistan, including the Taliban’s seizure of power and the 26 August attack at Kabul airport.  |
| 18 December 2020 [S/RES/2557](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_RES_2557%282020%29_E.pdf)  | This resolution renewed the mandate of the Monitoring Team supporting the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee for another year, until 17 December 2021.  |
| 15 September 2020 [S/RES/2543](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_RES_2543%282020%29_E.pdf)  | This was a resolution renewing the mandate of UNAMA until 17 September 2021.  |
| 28 August 2020 [S/RES/2538](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2538.pdf)  | This was on the role of women in peacekeeping operations.  |
| 10 March 2020 [S/RES/2513](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2513.pdf)  | This resolution welcomed the progress towards a political settlement of the war in Afghanistan facilitated by the 29 February “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” signed by the US and the Taliban, and the “Joint Declaration for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” issued by the US and the Afghan government.  |
| 16 December 2019 [S/RES/2501](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2501.pdf)  | This was a renewal of the mandate of the Monitoring Team assisting the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee until December 2020.  |
| 17 September 2019 [S/RES/2489](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2489.pdf)  | A unanimous adoption of resolution 2489, renewing the mandate of UNAMA until 17 September 2020.  |
| 15 March 2019 [S/RES/2460](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2460.pdf)  | This was a resolution in which a “technical rollover” was adopted, extending the mandate UNAMA for six months.  |
| 8 March 2018 [S/RES/2405](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2405.pdf)  | This was a resolution, unanimously adopted, extending the mandate of UNAMA for another year, welcoming the strategic review of the mission, and calling for implementation of its recommendations.  |
| 17 March 2017 [S/RES/2344](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2344.pdf)  | The Council renewed the mandate of UNAMA until 17 March 2018.  |
| 15 March 2016 [S/RES/2274](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2274.pdf)  | This was a resolution renewing the mandate of UNAMA for one year.  |
| 21 December 2015 [S/RES/2255](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2255.pdf)  | The Council adopted this resolution containing language clarifying how the 1988 Afghanistan sanctions regime functions and reflecting changing conflict dynamics in Afghanistan.  |
| 16 March 2015 [S/RES/2210](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2210.pdf)  | This was a resolution renewing the mandate of UNAMA until 17 March 2016.  |
| 12 December 2014 [S/RES/2189](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2189.pdf)  | This was a resolution welcoming the Afghanistan-NATO agreement to create the post-2014 Resolute Support Mission.  |
| 17 June 2014 [S/RES/2160](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2160.pdf)  | This resolution renewed, with minor adjustments, the 1988 Taliban sanctions regime.  |
| 17 March 2014 [S/RES/2145](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2145.pdf)  | This resolution renewed the mandate of UNAMA for a year.  |
| 10 October 2013 [S/RES/2120](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2120.pdf)  | This resolution extended the authorisation of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan until 31 December 2014.  |
| 19 March 2013 [S/RES/2096](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2096.pdf)  | This resolution extended the mandate of UNAMA until 19 March 2014.  |
| 17 December 2012 [S/RES/2082](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2082.pdf)  | This resolution modified the Taliban (1988) sanctions regime, allowing for a number of exemptions to make it easier for listed individuals to travel in order to participate in meetings in support of peace and reconciliation. It also renewed the Committee's Monitoring Team.  |
| 9 October 2012 [S/RES/2069](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2069.pdf)  | This resolution renewed the mandate of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan until 13 October 2013.  |
| 22 March 2012 [S/RES/2041](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20S%20RES%202041.pdf)  | This resolution renewed UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2013.  |
| 12 October 2011 [S/RES/2011](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afghan%20SRES%202011.pdf)  | This resolution renewed ISAF's mandate for one year.  |
| 17 June 2011 [S/RES/1988](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ROL%20SRES1988.pdf)  | This resolution established a separate Taliban/Afghanistan sanctions regime, with a separate list of Taliban individuals and entities subject to sanctions and a new Afghanistan focused sanctions committee.  |
| 22 March 2011 [S/RES/1974](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20S%20RES%201974.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2012.  |
| 13 October 2010 [S/RES/1943](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20S20101943.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2011.  |
| 22 March 2010 [S/RES/1917](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20S%20RES%201917.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2011.  |
| 8 October 2009 [S/RES/1890](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES%201890.pdf)  | This resolution extended the mandate for ISAF to 13 October 2010.  |
| 23 March 2009 [S/RES/1868](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1868.pdf)  | This resolution extended the UNAMA mandate for 12 months and requested quarterly reports from the Secretary-General.  |
| 22 September 2008 [S/RES/1833](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES%201833.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF's authorisation until 13 October 2009.  |
| 11 June 2008 [S/RES/1817](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afghan%20SRES%201817.pdf)  | This was the resolution restricting the trafficking of chemical precursors into Afghanistan.  |
| 20 March 2008 [S/RES/1806](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afghan%20S%20RES%201806.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA's mandate for 12 months until 23 March 2009.  |
| 19 September 2007 [S/RES/1776](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES%201776.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2008 and encouraged ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police.  |
| 23 March 2007 [S/RES/1746](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1746.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2008.  |
| 22 December 2006 [S/RES/1735](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20SRES%201735.pdf)  | This resolution further expanded the scope of the sanctions regime and the Committee's mandate, adopted new listing requirements, and extended and elaborated the mandate of the Monitoring Team.  |
| 19 December 2006 [S/RES/1730](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Terrorism%20S%20RES%201730.pdf)  | This resolution established "a focal point" within the UN Secretariat to process submissions for de-listing under Council resolutions involving targeted sanctions.  |
| 12 September 2006 [S/RES/1707](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES%201707.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2007.  |
| 23 March 2006 [S/RES/1662](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1662.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2007.  |
| 15 February 2006 [S/RES/1659](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1659.pdf)  | This resolution endorsed the Afghanistan Compact.  |
| 13 September 2005 [S/RES/1623](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1623.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2006.  |
| 29 July 2005 [S/RES/1617](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1617.pdf)  | This resolution significantly broadened the mandate of the Committee and the Monitoring Team and extended its mandate for an additional 17 months.  |
| 24 March 2005 [S/RES/1589](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1589.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA's mandate until 24 March 2006.  |
| 17 September 2004 [S/RES/1563](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1563.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF for an additional year until 13 October 2005.  |
| 26 March 2004 [S/RES/1536](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1536.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA for an additional year until 26 March 2005.  |
| 30 January 2004 [S/RES/1526](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20SRES%201526.pdf)  | This resolution strengthened the mandate of the 1267 Committee, and made more specific the financial sanctions, travel ban and arms embargo imposed on the individuals associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida.  |
| 13 October 2003 [S/RES/1510](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1510.pdf)  | This resolution expanded ISAF's mandate beyond Kabul.  |
| 28 March 2003 [S/RES/1471](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1471.pdf)  | This resolution extended UNAMA for an additional year until 28 March 2004, and endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal to include an electoral unit within UNAMA.  |
| 20 January 2003 [S/RES/1456](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1456.pdf)  | This resolution called on states to implement sanctions against terrorists, and mentioned in particular the Taliban and Al-Qaida.  |
| 17 January 2003 [S/RES/1455](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20SRES%201455.pdf)  | This resolution enhanced the monitoring role of the 1267 Committee; urged states to report progress on implementation of the sanctions; stressed the "need for improved coordination and increased exchange of information" between the 1267 Committee and the CTC; and established further reporting requirements by states.  |
| 24 December 2002 [S/RES/1453](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1453.pdf)  | This resolution welcomed and endorsed the Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations.  |
| 20 December 2002 [S/RES/1452](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1452.pdf)  | This resolution provided humanitarian exemptions to the assets freeze.  |
| 27 November 2002 [S/RES/1444](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1444.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF's mandate for one year until 20 December 2003, and requested quarterly reports of its activities.  |
| 26 June 2002 [S/RES/1419](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1419.pdf)  | This resolution welcomed the peaceful holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga from the 11 - 19 June 2002.  |
| 23 May 2002 [S/RES/1413](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1413.pdf)  | This resolution extended ISAF's mandate for six months until 20 December 2002.  |
| 28 March 2002 [S/RES/1401](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1401.pdf)  | This resolution created UNAMA.  |
| 28 January 2002 [S/RES/1390](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20SRES%201390.pdf)  | This resolution extended the financial measures and broadened the travel ban and arms embargo; requested States to report on the measures taken to enforce them; and requested the 1267 Committee "to cooperate" with the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).  |
| 15 January 2002 [S/RES/1388](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1388.pdf)  | This resolution amended sanctions on the Taliban and Al-Qaida, to not include Ariana Afghan Airlines.  |
| 20 December 2001 [S/RES/1386](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1386.pdf)  | This resolution authorised the establishment of ISAF to provide security in Kabul.  |
| 6 December 2001 [S/RES/1383](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/AFGH%20SRES1383.pdf)  | This resolution endorsed the Bonn Agreement on provisional arrangements until a permanent government could be re-established.  |
| 14 November 2001 [S/RES/1378](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1378.pdf)  | This resolution supported efforts by the Afghan people to establish a new transitional broad-based multi-ethnic government, and affirmed that the UN should play a central role in the establishment of this transitional government.  |
| 12 November 2001 [S/RES/1377](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1377.pdf)  | This resolution called on states to become party to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, to implement 1373 and to assist each other in doing so.  |
| 12 September 2001 [S/RES/1368](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1368.pdf)  | This resolution condemned the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and called on states to bring justice to the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of those terrorist acts.  |
| 30 July 2001 [S/RES/1363](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20SRES%201363.pdf)  | This resolution established the monitoring mechanism (the Monitoring Group (MG)) and the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team (up to 15 members with expertise in customs, border security and counter-terrorism). The MG was also tasked with offering assistance to states neighbouring Afghanistan to increase their capacity to implement the sanctions.  |
| 19 December 2000 [S/RES/1333](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20SRES%201333.pdf)  | This resolution strengthened the sanctions against the Taliban and imposed sanctions against Al-Qaida.  |
| 15 October 1999 [S/RES/1267](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20SRES1267.pdf)  | This resolution established the Al-Qaida and Taliban Committee and its sanctions mandate.  |
| 8 December 1998 [S/RES/1214](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1214.pdf)  | This resolution expressed grave concern at the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and called on the Taliban and other factions to call a cease-fire, and to resume negotiations.  |
| 28 August 1998 [S/RES/1193](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1193.pdf)  | This resolution expressed grave concern at the conflict in Afghanistan, and called it a growing threat to regional and international peace and security, demanded that all factions stop fighting and seek a peaceful resolution.  |
| 13 August 1998 [S/RES/1189](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1189.pdf)  | This resolution strongly condemned the terrorist bomb attacks of 7 August 1998 in eastern Africa.  |
| 22 October 1996 [S/RES/1076](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1076.pdf)  | This resolution called on all parties in Afghanistan to stop fighting, and engage in political dialogue. The Council also denounced the discrimination against girls and women.  |
| 11 January 1990 [S/RES/647](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES647.pdf)  | This resolution agreed to deploy UN military officers in Afghanistan and Pakistan to assist with the mission of good offices.  |
| 31 October 1988 [S/RES/622](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES622.pdf)  | This resolution authorised the establishment of UNGOMAP.  |
| 9 January 1980 [S/RES/462](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_462.pdf)  | This resolution invoked Uniting for Peace by calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly, following a veto by the Soviet Union on a draft resolution that would have called on its forces to withdraw from Afghanistan.  |
| 29 August 1946 [S/RES/8](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNMembers%20SRES8.pdf)  | This resolution recommended Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden for UN membership.  |

### UN Documents for Protection of Civilians: Secretary-General's Reports UN Dokumente zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung – Berichte des UN-Generalsekretärs

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| Secretary-General's Reports | [Return to full list](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/protection-of-civilians/) |
| 3 May 2021 [S/2021/423](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_423.pdf)  | This was the latest report of the Secretary-General on protection of civilians.  |
| 6 May 2020 [S/2020/366](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2020_366.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General's annual report on protection of civilians in armed conflict.  |
| 6 May 2020 [S/2020/366](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2020_366.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General’s annual report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.   |
| 7 May 2019 [S/2019/373](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2019_373.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General’s annual report on protection of civilians, which included a section on “missing persons”.  |
| 14 May 2018 [S/2018/462](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_462.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General's annual report on protection of civilians in armed conflict.  |
| 10 May 2017 [S/2017/414](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_414.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General's report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  |
| 13 May 2016 [S/2016/447](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_447.pdf)  | This was the 12th report on the protection of civilians.  |
| 2 September 2015 [S/2015/682](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_682.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ recommendations.  |
| 18 June 2015 [S/2015/453](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_453.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General’s 11th report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  |
| 22 November 2013 [S/2013/689](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_689.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General's 10th report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  |
| 22 May 2012 [S/2012/376](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_376.pdf)  | This was the ninth report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  |
| 29 April 2011 [S/2011/278](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chad%20S%202011%20278.pdf)  | This was a report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in Chad.  |
| 11 November 2010 [S/2010/579](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S2010%20579.pdf)  | This was a report on protection of civilians.  |
| 29 May 2009 [S/2009/277](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S2009277.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  |
| 28 October 2007 [S/2007/643](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20S2007643.pdf)  | This was a Secretary-General report on the protection of civilians.  |
| 29 June 2006 [S/2006/478](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S2006478.pdf)  | This was the report on the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army, which has operated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  |
| 28 November 2005 [S/2005/740](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20S2005%20740.pdf)  | This report recommended the Council adopt a new resolution to reflect the new challenges to the protection of civilians.  |
| 28 May 2004 [S/2004/431](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20S2004431.pdf)  | This was a report from the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians.  |
| 26 November 2002 [S/2002/1300](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/TL%20S2002%201300.pdf)  | This report contained a road map of recommendations for addressing protection needs.  |
| 30 March 2001 [S/2001/331](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Disarm%20S2001331.pdf)  | This was the report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians.  |
| 15 December 1999 [S/1999/1257](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S19991257.pdf)  | This letter transmitted the report by the independent inquiry commission set up by the Secretary-General concluding that information about human rights must be a natural part of the basis for decision-making on peacekeeping operations, within the Secretariat and by the Security Council.  |
| 8 September 1999 [S/1999/957](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20S1999957.pdf)  | This was the Secretary-General report on the protection of civilians.  |
| 22 September 1998 [S/1998/883](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20S1998883.pdf)  | This was the report on protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations.  |

### United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan-UNAMA Unterstützungsmission der Vereinten Nationen in Afghanistan

UNAMA: <https://unama.unmissions.org/about>

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_report_2021_26_july.pdf>
Halbjahresbericht 2021

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_revs3.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2020

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_special_report_attacks_on_healthcare_during_the_covid-19_pandemic_20_june_2020.pdf>
Special Report: Attacks on Healthcare During the COVID-19 Pandemic (released June 2020)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2019.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2019

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_special_report_-_2019_election-related_violence_0.pdf>
Special Report on 2019 Election Violence (released October 2019)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_-_unama_special_report_usfor-a_airstrikes_bakwa_-_9_october.pdf>
Special Report on Airstrikes on Alleged Drug-Processing Facilities (released October 2019)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_annual_protection_of_civilians_report_2018_-_23_feb_2019_-_english.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2018

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special_report_on_2018_elections_violence_november_2018.pdf>
Special Report on 2018 Elections Violence (released November 2018)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_special_report_suicide_and_other_ied_devices_october_2018_-_english.pdf>
Special Report on Harm to Civilians from IEDs (released October 2018)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_-_special_report_-_election-related_attacks_and_abuses_may_2018_english_3.pdf>
Special Report on Election-Related Security Incidents (released May 2018)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_protection_of_civilians_special_report_2_april_aerial_operations_final.pdf>
Special Report on Airstrikes in Dasht-e-Archi (released May 2018)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2017_final_6_march.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2017

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_report_on_attacks_against_places_of_worship_7nov2017_0.pdf>
Special Report on Attacks on Places of Worship (released November 2017)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english.pdf>
Special Report on Attacks in Mirza Olang (released August 2017)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_annual_report_2016_final280317.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2016

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/23_july_suicide_attack_against_peaceful_demonstration_-_18_oct_2016.pdf>
Special Report on 23 July 2016 Kabul Attack (released October 2016)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc_annual_report_2015_final_14_feb_2016.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2015

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special_report_on_kunduz_province_12_december_2015-english.pdf>
Special Report on Kunduz Province (released December 2015)

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2014-annual-report-on-protection-of-civilians-final.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2014

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/feb_8_2014_poc-report_2013-full-report-eng.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2013

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2012_annual_report_eng_0.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2012

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_report_final_feb_2012.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2011

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/engi_version_of_poc_annual_report_2011.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2010

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilian_2009_report_english_1.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2009

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_09february-annual20report_poc202008_final_11feb09.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2008

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc-civilian-casualties-report-2007.pdf>
Jahresbericht 2007

<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/caac_islam_booklet_english_with_correction_v2_.pdf>
Booklet on 'Protecting Afghanistan’s Children in Armed Conflict' (released May 2014)

### United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODCBüro der Vereinten Nationen für Drogen- und Verbrechensbekämpfung

<https://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/index.html>

Der Drogenbericht 2021: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wdr2021.html>

Frühere Berichte:

[World Drug Report 2020](https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/index2020.html)  [World Drug Report 2019](https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/)
[World Drug Report 2018](https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/)
[World Drug Report 2017](https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/)[World Drug Report 2016](https://www.unodc.org/wdr2016/)
[World Drug Report 2015](https://www.unodc.org/wdr2015/)[World Drug Report 2014](https://www.unodc.org/wdr2014/)[World Drug Report 2013](https://www.unodc.org/wdr2013/)
[World Drug Report 2012](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2012.html)
[World Drug Report 2011](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html)[World Drug Report 2010](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2010.html)
[World Drug Report 2009](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2009.html) [World Drug Report 2008](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2008.html)
[World Drug Report 2007](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2007.html)
[World Drug Report 2006](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2006.html)
[World Drug Report 2005](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2005.html)
[World Drug Report 2004](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2004.html)
[Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global_illicit_drug_drug_trends.html)
[Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global_illicit_drug_drug_trends.html)
[Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global_illicit_drug_drug_trends.html)
[World Drug Report 2000](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2000.html)
[Global Illicit Drug Trends 2000](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/report_2000-09-21_1.pdf)
[Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/report_1999-06-01_1.pdf)
[World Drug Report 1997](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-1997.html)

Evaluations from their webpage, nur bis 2010 zu finden.

**2010**

[AFG/R86 'Strengthening Anti-Corruption Measures in Afghanistan' (Mid-term Evaluation)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/final_version_mid-term_evaluation_report_afgr86-1_rev.pdf)

[AFG/I85 'Regional Cooperation in Precursor Control between Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries' (Mid-term Evaluation)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/midterm_evaluation_report_afgi85_rev.pdf)

[AFG/I87 'Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control' (Mid-term Evaluation)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/mid_-term_evaluation_report_afg_i87_feb.2010_rev.pdf)

[AFG/R87 'Prison System Reform in Afghanistan - Extension to the Provinces' (Terminal Evaluation)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/terminal_evaluation_report_r87-1_rev.pdf)

[AFG/T21 'Developing Post-Release Opportunities for Women and Girls Prisoners: Extension to the Provinces' (Terminal Evaluation)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/final_evaluation_report_afg_t21_rev.pdf)

**2009**

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## Nordallianz, lokale „War Lords“ und Milizen

(Siehe auch die Sammlung zum afghanischen Militär und Polizei; die Abgrenzung ist nicht immer einfach).

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